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PIEture
Frames'
Pictures-in the sense of still photographs-can be divided
into two classes, private and public.
Private pictures are those designed for display within the
intimate social circle of the persons featured in thempictures taken (with or without recourse to a professional
photographer) in order to commemorate occasions, relationships, achievements, and life-turning points, whether of a
familial or organizational kind.
The special properties of private pictures as part of our
domestic ceremonial life are worth considering, and this can
be done best, perhaps, by starting with ceremony and
working to pictures.
Ritual and ceremonial involve portraiture, involve making
palpable to the senses what might otherwise remain buried
and tacit in the structure of social life. The traditional
argument is that these enactments function to reaffirm basic
social arrangements and ultimate beliefs regarding man and
nature.
Ritual and ceremonial are accomplished through doingsthrough making appearances, taking up microecological
positions relative to others, performing gestures- and in the
nature of doings are soon, if not quickly, completed or
played out. (Duration can vary anywhere from the microsecond taken to administer a smile to the six weeks required
for the most obdurate of festivities.) As such, these acts can
be distinguished from another class of devices which also
help (albeit in a very small way) to maintain us in felt
support of our social structure: souvenirs, mementoes, gifts,
commemoratives, and other rei ics. These objects, ofttimes
directly a part of what it is they celebrate, just as often
poorly portray these celebrated social arrangements. But
since objects are involved, not actions, things, not enactments, they can last a long time-in the relevant sense
forever.
Consider now the pictorial arts. A feature of drawings,
paintings, sculpture, and especially photographs, is that these
artifacts allow for a combination of ritual and relic. The
rendition of structurally important social arrangements and
ultimate beliefs which ceremony fleetingly provides the
senses, still photography can further condense, omitting
temporal sequence and everything else except static visual
arrays. And what is caught is fixed into permanent accessi-
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1
1 have benefited from harsh criticism and a great number of
useful suggestions from Sol Worth; also, in a general way, from
Goodman (1968}.
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bility, becoming something that can be attended anywhere,
for any length of time, and at moments of one's own
choosing.
Thus it is in modern times-and as the modern contribution to ceremonial life-that whenever there is a wedding, an
investiture, a birthday party, a graduation exercise, an
extended voyage begun or terminated, a picnic, a shop
opening, a vacation, or even a visit, snapshots may well be
taken, developed, and the prints kept easy to hand. 2
Something like self-worship can thus be accomplished. The
individual is able to catch himself at a moment when-for
him-he is in ideal surroundings, in association with socially
desirable others, garbed in a self-enhancing way (which for
white-collar men may mean the rough and manly wear of
fishermen, hunters, wranglers, or machinists), poised for a
promising take-off, terminating an important engagement,
and with a socially euphoric look on his face. A moment
when what is visible about him attests to social matters about
which he is proud. A moment, in short, when he is in social
bloom, ready, therefore, to accept his appearance as a
typification of himself. 3 This moment he can dry-freeze and
hang on the walls of his house, his office, his shop, his locker,
and his wallet, a reference point to which he can return time
and again (and long after he can no longer live the scene) as
testimonial, as evidence, as depiction, of what his best social
self has been and, by implication, must still be. A modest
pact with the devil: the individual can shift the ravages of
time from his triumphant appearances to his current ones,
the only cost being to have slightly spoiled involvement in
these former scenes, these high points, consequent on the
postural reframing distractively induced by either the
immanent prospect of being snapped or the mechanics of
doing the snapping or (with Polaroid) a viewing of the
viewing.

II

Public pictures are those designed to catch a wider

audience-an anonymous aggregate of individuals unconnected to one another by social relationship and social
interaction, although falling within the same market or the
same political jurisdiction, the same outreaches of appeal.
Here a photographic print is usually not the final form, only
a preliminary step in some type of photo-mechanical
reproduction in newspapers, magazines, books, leaflets, or
posters.
Public pictures themselves are diverse in function and
character. For example, there are commercial pictures

2
During the recent European wars, military personnel of all ranks
seemed drawn to photographic portraiture in dress uniform-a
commonality of ritual orientation that cut across nations and
alliances. Why? To provide a memorial image that might well turn out
to be the last one? (But then why not in civvies?} To bolster a social
identity newly minted and therefore shaky? To mark the occasion of
elevation to one's current military rank, whatever that happened to
be? Or is the wearing of a uniform that neatly identifies one's
situation in life to all viewers (at a time when one suddenly finds
oneself in a situation that can be neatly identified} already a kind of
portraiture, whose reproduction then momentarily reestablishes
protraiture in its normal role?
3

A similar argument concerning the content of home movies may
be found in Chalfen (1975 :95-97}.
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designed to sell a product for an advertiser.
There are news photos, involving matters held to be of
current scientific, social, and political concern.
There are instructional pictures, as found, say, in medical
text books, the figures in them intended to be anonymous,
serving only (apparently) as illustrations of what can be
visited on man. (In fact, many illustrations, including the line
drawings in dictionaries, are also ty pificat ions, a variable
mixture unadmittedly responsive to preconcepti ons concerning the average, the essential, and the ideal.)
There are human interest pictures, also anonymous,
oftti mes candid, in which otherwise unnoteworthy individuals confirm our doctrine of expression by eloquently (and
presumably unintendedly) choreographing some response,
such as fear, puzzlement, surprise, love, shyness, or some
inner state, such as joy, hopelessness, innocence, or how we
look and what we do when we think no one is present to
observe us. To which must be added scenes that a well-placed
camera can compose into some sort of "aesthetic" design or
into a conventionally evocative portrait of nature. All of
these pictured scenes can hopefully be viewed as ends in
themselves, timeless, and arty. (In this domain, observe, the
line between private and public can waver. 4 Countless
enthusiasts are encouraged by a mass hobby apparatus to
invest in serious photographic equipment, acquire professional techniques, and take non-family pictures styled for
hanging in a gallery. Although only friends and relatives of
the household are likely to view the results, in principle they
do so "critically" in their capacity as anonymous members of
the wider public. And should a larger stage be offered the
amateur, the occasion is likely to be seized as recognition,
not avoided as an invasion of privacy.)
Finally, there are personal publicity pictures, ones
designed to bring before the public a flattering portrait of
some luminary, whether politicaV religious, military, sporting, theatrical, literary, 6 or- where a class elite still functions
and is publicized- social.
Involved here are actual or putative leadership and
symbolization of some structure or hierarchy or value
presentable as central to society. Note, the publicity function
extends far beyond personal publicity shots, seeping into
almost every kind of picture. Commercial pictures often link
a product to a celebrity, selling them both. The pictorial
record made of important public ceremonies necessarily gives
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For this and other suggestions, I am grateful to Dorothea
Hurvich.
5

A deft discussion of political portraits is Roland Barthes'
"Photography and Electoral Appeal" (1972:91-93).

personal publicity to those who officiate. News events are
very often presented through the words and presence of
political leaders, a write-up of the first accompanied by a
picture of the second. Human interest shots have more
interest if they involve famous subjects. Even the celebrity's
personal-life rituals can be publicized as a means of affirming
in everyone's life what is being affirmed in his own, so that
whatever his particular domain, he will tend to become a
public performer of private ceremonies and have extra reason
on such occasions for taking pictures and ensuring that they
are good ones-a mutual contamination of public and private
which comes to a head in fan magazines. In the limiting case
of a social elite, mere attendance at a particular social
function or mere visiting of a particular place can qualify as
newsworthy, these performers being empowered to
transform social participation from routine into ritual. A
reminder that every undertaking has a sacred element and
can be done in circumstances which realize its hierarchical
potential. Here, may I add, the British Royal Family is the
modern creative force, leading the civilized world in knowhow for the mass production of personal publicity.
Celebrities not only link their own private lives to the
public domain, but also can link the lives of private persons
to it. For persons in the pub Iic eye representing something of
value and concern to many-persons possessing regional or
national renown-seem to acquire as one of their powers the
capacity to be a contagious high point. Politicians, sports
stars, entertainers, and other notables qualify. In contrast to
pictures of Jesus, Lenin, and the British Royal Family, those
of ordinary celebrities are not always likely to carry enough
ritual impact to warrant a place on · the mantel; nonetheless,
celebrities need but pose for a picture in the company of a
member of their public to manufacture a memento for him,
one that speaks to his ideal attributes, a sort of elevation by
photographically attested association. Note that a personal
inscription can function as a weak substitute for joint
appearance. 7 (In exchange for their endorsement, then,
celebrities acquire a small billboard, rent free .) Thus in bars,
restaurants, drycleaning establishments, and offices, these
trophies jostle with family pictures, the latter being trophies,
too, for they attest to the domestic property (and domestic
piety) of the establishment's proprietor, which property,
incidentally, has also been photographed in ideal circumstances.
In all of this, note, photographic portraiture represents a
rather significant social invention, for, even apart from its
role in domestic ritual, it has come to provide a low and very
little guarded point in th e barrier that both protects and
restrains persons of private life from passing over into public
recognition.

6

For male novelists pictured on the back of their dust covers,
this means (currently) rough, open shirts, tousled hair, youthful, virile
appearance, and often a brooding look, this last bespeaking the deep
thoughts that are proper to the innards of the species. Male poets may
feel obliged to appear even more feeling. Nonfiction writers also
present pictures of themselves as part of the merchandising of their
product, but their posing suggests more the steady march of thought
than the psychic cost of so directly addressing the human condition.
Interestingly, even those who publish slashing analyses of advertising
find reason to allow their pictures to appear on the jacket in a posture
calculated to confirm that qualities of the book are to be seen in
qualities of the appearance of the writer, thus promoting a folk
theory of expression along with their books and themselves.

Ill

To consider photographs- private and public- it is
necessary, apparently, to consider the question of
perception and reality, and it is necessary to control

7

American presidents have the distinction (one of their few) of
having circulated inscribed pictures in their pre-election capacity, and
after election circulating ones that qualify as hangable without an
inscription.
GENDER ADVERTISEMENTS
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somehow the systematic ambiguities that characterize our
everday talk about pictures.
(1) Pictures comprise the class of two-dimensional images
that have been processed into fixed form, the chief examples
being drawings, paintings, photographs, and, of course,
letterpress reproductions of them all. (What Narcissus saw
was a reflection, not a photograph.) A "real" or "actual"
photograph consists of a piece of stiff, emulsified paper
containing marks and shadings on one side, a text providing
us with an image that has been processed photographically,
not some other way. (Obviously, a photograph does not
embody objects that it pictures-as Sol Worth remarks, a
picture of fire is not hot- although some might want to say
that the exposed surface does embody a perspectival transformation of some of the relationships within the scene upon
which the camera focused.) By this definition it follows that
a photograph that has been "touched up," miscaptioned, or
even doctored is still a real one. The realness of a photograph
would only figure when, say, there was a concern to prevent
it from getting crumpled, soiled or torn, or to control the
effect of the texture of a paper stock upon depth perception,
or to discover that what appeared to be a photograph was
indeed a cleverly disguised realistic painting. (What is only
something else and not really a photograph involves a slightly
different, and certainly lesser, issue than that of what is not
really something else but only a photograph. For there are
lots of flat, papery things that a photograph can replicatewhether or not with intent to deceive- dollar bills, water
colors, and cardiograms being examples; indeed, with
experimental controls a photograph pasted into a window
can be mistaken for a three dimensional real scene. 8 )
· Consideration of what is a "real" picture leads to a
consideration of what is the "same" picture, and thus
to a version of the type-token issue. We speak of the
"same" or "identical" picture when referring to two
quite different possibilities: two like prints from the
self-same negative, and two meetings-up with the
self-same print. I don't think this particular ambiguity
causes trouble; in any case, unlike the situation with
coins, here terminology is ready to hand any time we
need to specify.
I believe that the significant question, and one that
everyday use and terminology does obscure, is not what
a photograph is, or what would count as the same
photograph, but what a particular photograph is of- a
concern, incidentally, that allows one to treat a

8

1t is worth noting that art historians who compare various forms
of representation - etchings, woodcuts, drawings, paintings, photographs-and use illustrations in their books to ex plicate the
differences, tend to treat the ground of their own operation ,
letterpress graphics, as something to be taken for granted, something
without constraining characteristics of its own , in this following the
lay framing practice of treating the medium in which one is oneself
working as limitless and featureless.
9

A close issue here. Apart from the question of permanency, a
camera can take an instantaneous picture that contains vastly more
detail, shading, and breadth than the eye can capture in the same
length of time, the eye being restricted apparently to flitting about
taking spot checks which the brain then edits and composes
accordingly. However, before the camera's pictures (once developed
and printed) can be of any final use, an eye must view it, and that

photograph and its printing press reproduction as the
same.
Somehow we learn to decode small, flat tracings for large,
three dimensional scenes in a manner som~what corresponding to the way we have learned to interpret our visual
images of real objects. (Because a photograph has nearly
perfect geometric perspective - sa~ing one taken, for example,
with a distorting wide-angle lens- it is very like the image
projected on the retina of one eye, were the retina to be
blocked from its usual scanning; but retinal images
themselves are systematically modified by constancy scaling
based on additional depth cues drawn in part from stereoscopic and parallax-motion effects which photography must
do without.) 9 Here the point is not that our use of our eyes
and our pictures has had to be learned, or that this learning
draws deeply and fallibly on past experience with the world
in all sensory modalities (allowing us to make effective use of
small cues and good hypotheses as to which of a set of
possible states is to be judged the actual one), but that it
does ge~ learned (in our society), rendering the eyeing of live
scenes, and of pictures of scenes, efficacious and more or less
equivalent. And note, this deciphering competency that we
acquire with respect to live scenes, and pictures of scenes,
does not make us acute about just any set of perceptual
details, but rather those which allow us to make
conventionally important discriminations; for it is about
these matters that are of general social relevance that we will
have bothered to accumulate experience. 1 0 Perhaps, then,
the primary difference between an interpretation of a live
view and an interpretation of a picture of it is that live
viewing ordinarily assures that what is seen is as it appears
now, whereas a picture, at best, guarantees that it was once
so.
In sum, one can say that, as a result of acquired
interpretive competence, things (or rather aspects of things)
in effect are as they seem to be seen, and as they seem to be
pictured, notwithstanding the fact that the actual image on
the retina and on the photographic paper is a somewhat
different matter. And one should be able to say that a
photograph in effect can provide us with an objective,
veridical version- an "actual picture of' socially important
aspects of what is in fact out there.
However, these conclusions drawn from the psychology of
perception fail to tell us why there should be so much doubt
and concern among students as to what in fact photographs
do represent. The ·frame-theoretical issue of the various

viewing will suffer all the limits of the eye compared to the camera
plus an extra set, namely, the limitation of having to start with a
photograph, not the real thing.
10

The framework of experience required in order to interpret
some photographs (such as those taken of missile sites, elementary
particle pathways, minor meteors) may be so restricted that a lay
person might not even be able to see what he is seeing when it is
pointed out. However, valid perception is not a question of votes but
of competence, W. I. Thomas notwithstanding. And that is not to say
that viewers somehow read beyond the "simple" physical images that
are "given" them; for a physicalistic, "objective," "literal" description
is itself, of course, interpretive, having to be learned, too- a fact quite
independent of how common this learning is. There are no naked
facts, merely various types of inferential elaboration, but that is not
to say that inferences, common or otherwise, are necessarily arbitrary.
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senses in which pictures are said to be true, real, valid,
candid, realistic, expressive, or, contrariwise false faked
posed, unfaithful, doctored, guyed, still rem~ins o~en, and
social, not psychological, answers must be sought. The easy
sense of the man in the street that the meaning of pictures is
clear enough comes from an easy willingness to avoid
thinking about the meanings of meaning.
(2) It is clear that an artist can execute a drawing or
painting from memory and imagination, processsing an image
of, say, a person who is no more or even never was. One
might say that the result was a picture of a subject (or
"figure"), not meaning to imply by this "of" that the subject
is now, or ever was, real. Subjects belong to very human
realms of being but not always to the current, real world. A
subject, note, may be a building or a landscape or a stag at
bay or the crossing of the Delaware; it can also be a person,
the chief concern here. (French in this regard is clearer than
English: a special reference for the word personnage
designates a member of the fictional realm, the term
personne being reserved for designating a member of ours.)
Now it happens that when something that is not present
to him is to be the subject of a painter's work, he may steady
his task of rendition by employing a stand-in, mock-up, or
substitute-things of this world that are materially to hand
and can serve as guides during phases of the canvas
processing. Thus, for an historical figure, he may use a living
person there in the flesh; for a mythical beast with unnatural
appendages, a real beast with natural ones. A material guide
is often called a model, especially when a person or animal is
involved, and will be called that here, although other (and
confusingly relevant) meanings can also be given to that term
(Goffman 1974, esp. 41 ). Note, incidentally, a parallel
distinction in the theater, where it is fully understood that a
character or protagonist belongs to a make-believe realm of
being that is dramatized, and the actor who takes a part and
stages its character belongs to another, namely, everyd·ay
reality. Indeed, from the theater comes the term "prop" to
remind us that some artifacts have, as it were, no life of their
own, taking their identifying title from the fact that their
crude similarity to certain objects in the real world (along
with their cheapness and maneuverability) allows them to be
used in plays as if they were these objects, this role in
dramaturgy being their only one.
If one allows that a painter may use a material object as a
11

Matters can get a little complicated here. A movie actor may be
given a stand-in so that in staging a character he himself will not have
to engage in tedious or dangerous activity. Clearly (and simply): a
model for a model. Novelists, with no intent to engage in covert
biography, sometimes pattern a fictional character upon a real person
in their social circle, subject and model here being quite distinct, there
being an obligation to blur the copy and make a secret of the identity
of the model. Biography, on the other hand, allows and requires that
the subject and model be one. In biographical plays, then, the
character onstage becomes a refraction both of the actor who is
taking the part and of the person who was the inspiration for the part.
It is a tart experience (or a sad experience), but not necessarily a
confusing one, that is produced when the inspiration for a character
serves also as the actor of the part, as when the famous gunfighters of
the West ended their years by "going on the road" with enactments of
themselves. The tricky case is the roman clef, where a connection
between subject and model is formally denied (as prefatory
admonitions regarding the coincidence of resemblance attest) but

a

guide (whether model, prop, or whatever) to help him in his
rendering, and if this guiding function is taken as central to
one's conception of such objects, then one might extend the
category to include objects which the artist uses not only as a
guide but also as a subject. After all, to sit for a portrait is to
serve as a subject and as its model, and so one is forced to say
that a stand-in can be the real thing. 11
Unlike what is required in drawing, painting, or fiction,
but like the theater, a photograph requires material
guides-"models" in the cases that interest us. The play of
light and shadow upon something out there in the real world
is necessary, and furthermore, is necessary at the moment the
picture is taken.
Observe that just a·s a photograph can be said to be of its
subject, this being our first sense of "of," so it can be said to
be of its model, this being our second sense of "of." The
convenience of using one word here instead of two, is, I
believe, a disaster for analysis, for although biblical paintings
and the theatrical stage provide no problem in the distinction
between subject and model (or character and actor), photography deeply confounds the matter in several ways-now
merging subject and model, now concealing a difference, now
taking a difference for granted, and in general causing us to
think we are concerned with one problem when we really are
concerned about another.

IV

(1) A "caught" or "candid" photograph may be
defined as featuring models that have not been
arrayed to serve as such, that is, to serve as something to
photograph on this occasion. Such pictures show objects and
events as they are in regard to some matters other than
photography. For human models this means ordinarily that
they are unaware that a camera is where it is, or that they are
so deeply caught up in other vital matters that they either
give no weight to the fact that they are being photographed
or modify whatever they are doing only to the extent
required for a disjunctive monitoring shift in response to the
sudden appearance of a camera. 1 2 (All models can be angled,
if not manipulated, for photographic effect; only human
ones can do this on their own behalf.) Caught pictures can
provide valid documents or records, allowing the viewer to
make relatively reliable inferences as to what had led up to
the activity represented and what was likely to have

guessing at the identity of the model is encouraged (or at least
thought to be), along with the belief that the copying is close.
12

1n fact, matters are a little more complicated. Of the infinite
number of scenes photographers might catch, they manage to (and
bother to) catch only a small number, and these tend to be ones
whose content make evident that the pictures could only have been
caught. So a caught picture turns out to be a patently caught one.
Also note that whereas the term "caught" seems to be preferentially
applied to a scene upon which a camera would have been unlikely, the
term "candid" seems to be preferentially used in reference to scenes
wherein the participants would ordinarily have been unwilling to
continue on with what they had been doing had they but known that
a camera was in action. Understandably, some candid pictures present
models breaking frame, not only turning precipitously to monitor the
camera's intrusion, but also simultaneously attempting to obscure the
appearance they had been giving. What is candid about such pictures
turns out to be covering behavior, not what the behavior covers.
GENDER ADVERT SEMENTS
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followed, in the same way, if to a lesser extent, as can an
actual viewer of a live scene infer what is going on at the
moment of viewing. It is in this way that caught pictures can
be used as strong evidence concerning the existence of a state
of affairs or of the occurrence of an event. Thus, a pictured
individual who can be "personally identified," that is, a
subject that provides us with effective evidence of the
biographical identification of its model, can serve to demonstrate that its model had been in a certain place doing a
certain thing and in association with certain others, which
demonstration courts of law may be induced to accept. For
example, insurance claims for injuries have been defeated by
photographs secretly taken of the claimant while he was
engaged in demanding performances, such as bowling,
climbing ladders, and the like. Denial of "knowing" someone
has similarly been defeated by pictures of the claimant
chatting with the person he claims not to know. Bank
robbers have faced similar problems due to security photography. In fact, on occasion in courts, claims as to what
occurred may find better support through photographs than
through direct testimony. Drawings, however real is tic, are
not used in this particular way, although they can be
employed in identificatory pol ice work. 1 3
{2) Caught photographs are to be contrasted to another
class, whose members share the property that inferences as to
what was going on in the scene cannot be correctly made
from what is pictured.
First, there are photographs {often caught ones) which
have been covertly "doctored" or "faked," as when a picture
of someone's face is superimposed on a picture of someone
else's body, and the whole passed off as evidence that the
13

1n his Art and Illusion, E. H. Gombrich presents the interesting
argument that a picture cannot be true or false in itself, these
possibilities being reserved for the caption or label:
Logicians tell us- and they are not people to be easily
gainsaid - that the terms "true" and "false" can only be applied to
statements, propositions. And whatever may be the usage of
critical parlance, a picture is never a statement in that sense of the
term. It can no more be true or false than a statement can be blue
or green. Much confusion has been caused in aesthetics by
disregarding this simple fact. It is an understandable confusion
because in our culture pictures are usually labeled, and labels, or
captions, can be understood as abbreviated statements. When it is
said "the camera cannot lie," this confusion is apparent.
Propaganda in wartime often made use of photographs falsely
labeled to accuse or exculpate one of the warring parties. Even in
scientific illustrations it is the caption which determines the truth
of the picture. In a cause celebre of the last century, the embryo
of a pig, labeled as a human embryo to prove a theory of
evolution, brought about the downfall of a great reputation.
Without much reflection, we can all expand into statements the
laconic captions we find in museums and books. When we read the
name "Ludwig Richter" under a landscape painting, we know we
are thus informed that he painted it and can begin arguing whether
this information is true or false. When we read "Tivoli," we infer
the picture is to be taken as a view of that spot, and we can again
agree or disagree with the label. How and when we agree, in such a
case, will largely depend on what we want to know about the
object represented. The Bayeux tapestry, for instance, tells us
there was a battle of Hastings. It does not tell us what Hastings
"looked like." [1961:67-68].
In sum, a caption frames a picture, telling us what aspect of it is to be
attended a~d in what light this aspect of matters is to be seen - e.g.,
the way thmgs once were, the way they might be in the future, the
82

owner of the face was present in the scene depicted. Or a
seriously misleading caption is employed encouraging a false
attribution of model to subject.
Second are the kind of pictures that can be said to be
arranged, rigged, or set up, implying that models and scenic
materials, real enough in their own right, were brought
together and choreographed to induce radically wrong
inferences as to "who" had been present and/or what had
been going on. The result is a picture of a covertly contrived
scene; the picture is an actual one, but it is not actually of
the scene it portrays. The classic case here is the collusively
arranged infidelity picture, once so popular in British divorce
proceedings, providing perfectly valid evidence that a
particular man had been in a particular room with a
particular woman not his wife, the misleading restricted to
their doings and her professional identity. The wrong
impression the court is induced to receive {or rather gives the
appearance of receiving) is much like the one that the hotel
clerk could have obtained of the actual doings, although he
might get to see the picture taking as well as the scene the
picture taker took. Observe that a doctored picture, whether
intended to mislead or not, requires no cooperation from the
models, the fabrication being done after, not before, picture
taking; rigged pictures, on the other hand, ordinarily require
collaborative posing before the picture is snapped, although
admittedly if models are caught at the right moment from
the right angle, they can find that they have unintentionally
produced a picture that is rigged in effect/ 4 as they can if
they know they are about to be photographed but the
photographer does not know they know. Observe, too, that
although eyes and cameras can be similarly fooled, it is
dream of the artist, a tribute to the style of some period, and so forth.
But, of course, this approach entirely begs the question. In a great
number of contexts an uncaptioned photograph is understood to
present a claim regarding the properties and character of the model,
courts of law only being the most obvious. (The very fact that effort
is made to doctor pictures presupposes that ordinarily pictures imply
an avowal about reality and that this avowal is ordinarily validj the
same assumption is not made of other modes of representation, and
understandably so.) Any object, not merely a picture, is subject to
covert simulation and various forms of overt reconstitutings. These
transformations nonetheless remain just that, transformations of an
original. But granted that the interpretation a picture is given, that is,
the sense in which it is taken, derives from the context of use, one
must see that the caption, when there is one, is but one part of this
context. A caption, then, can be true or false only if its context
carries another caption, albeit a tacit one: "The statements made here
are meant to be taken as avowals of what is." And the reading a
caption can cause us to make of a picture, other elements of context
can cause us to make of the caption. (The caption "fantasy" can tell
us how to read a picture in an art book, but what does it tell us about
a picture in the National Lampoon?) A statement of fact, laconic or
expanded , can be presented as a quotation, an example of literary
style, a display of print format, etc., being no less vulnerable to
special readings than are pictures. In any case, a photograph that is
falsely captioned (whether to deceive or for openly playful purposes)
can still present a perfectly valid representation of its model, the only
problem being that the model can't be correctly identified from the
caption. May I add that although obviously the angle, light, timing,
camera distance, lens, film development, printing, and the photographer's intent can very significantly influence what a picture
reproduces, in every case the model must introduce a pattern of
constraints as well.
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For this, and for other suggestions incorporated
acknowledgment, I am grateful to Richard Chalfen.
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usually far easier to hoodwink the viewer of a picture than
the viewer of a live scene, for reasons quite apart from, say,
the consequence of insufficient depth cues. For the still
photographer's practice of holding his camera to a small field
and (necessarily) to a single angle can, in the shooting of a
rigged scene, protect his illusion from anything disconfirming
that might lie just beyond the posing; and what has been
posed need only be held long enough to snap it. A live viewer
could hardly be restricted this way, and unless he wore
blinders and kept his head in a vice, would have to be faced
with fakery that is considerably more extensive if it is to be
effective- although admittedly he is not often in a position
to pore over what he sees for flaws, whereas the viewer of a
picture usually is.
(3) Pictures that are covertly doctored or covertly rigged .
display scenes that can't be read in the same way that
uncontrived ones routinely can, as a swarm of warrants for
drawing sound conclusions as to who had been present and
what had been going on there. Such covertly faked pictures"fabrications"-are to be distinguished from ones that are
also concocted, but this time admittedly, whether by
arranging what is photographed or doctoring a photograph
already taken. 1 5 Openly contrived scenes provide a "keying"
of photographic evidence as to who was present and what
had been going on. 16 The central example here is what might
be called "commercial realism," the standard transformation
employed Tr1 contemporary ads, in which the scene is
conceivable in all detail as one that could in theory have
occurred as pictured, providing us with a simulated slice of
life; but although the advertiser does not seem intent on
passing the picture off as a caught one, the understanding
seems to be that we will not press him too far to account for
just what sort of reality the scene has. (The term "realistic,"
like the term "sincerity" when applied to a stage actor, is
self-contradictory, meaning something that is praiseworthy
by virtue of being like something else, although not that
something else.) Commercial realism is to be sharply distinguished from scenes posed with unlikely professionals and
apparently intended to be wrongly seen as caught, and from
scenes that are caught ones but now embedded in an
advertisement. 1 7 Observe that commercial realism provides
15

Currently newspapers and magazines exercise very wide liberty
in presenting openly doctored pictures featuring bits of anatomy of celebrities, especially political ones, the portraits completed by line drawings, cartoons, other photographs, and the like. Precisely in what frame
readers interpret such pictures is not clear, since what can be legally defended as an evident fantasy may not be so treated by some viewers.
16
A fuller treatment of "keying" and "fabrication" is presented in
Goffman (1974, esp. ch. 3, 4).
17
There are deviations from commercial realism that are more
subtle. Thus, one finds that a picture in an annual company report
displaying the company's restaurant equipment with the aid of two
secretaries posing as persons dining out and another as a waitress can
convey not so much that there is a difference between subject and
model, but that these particular models are not making every effort to
conceal that they are unprofessional ones, thereby posing as models
posing as participants in a restaurant scene. A comparable frame
complexity is found in the use of simulated home movies as part of
the scenario of a commercial one, or the use in radio commercials of
"interviews" with carefully selected ordinary consumers, "citizens,"
who have been rehearsed into displaying the restarts, filled pauses,
and little floodings that presumably distinguish the efforts of real
interviewees from the responses performed by studio actors.

especially nice examples of the subject-model issue. Asked
what is in a particular ad, we might say, "A family fishing."
What makes us think the four subjects in the picture are in a
family relationship to one another is exactly what might
make us infer such a relationship with respect to strangers in
real life. So, too, on seeing images of fishing lines in the
water. Asked whether we think the four persons who
modeled for the picture are really a family or if there are
hooks on the lines, the answer could well be, "Probably not,
but what does it matter?" The point about an ad is what its
composer meant us to infer as to what is going on in the
make-believe pictured scene, not what had actually been
going on in the real doings that were pictured. The issue is
subject, not model.
It is thus that the constraints on picture scene production
can be properly sorted. An ad featuring a nude woman
subject raises questions about the modesty of the model,
especially if she is a well-known one; an ad featuring nuns
clustered in front of a station wagon in honor of GM 's
tilt-wheel steering can (and did) raise questions about the
desecration of subjects-the models in this case being well
covered by unaccustomed habit (see Livingston 1976).
Advertisements that employ commercial realism or some
other variety of overtly concocted scene can be aptly
compared to what the stage presents. In both cases the
viewer is to engage knowingly in a kind of make-believe,
treating the depicted world as if it were real-like but of
course not actually real. The differences are interesting. One
is that although we undoubtedly can involve ourselves more
deeply in staged make-believe than in advertisements, it is
probably the case that viewers more frequently reify, that is,
"downkey," ads than plays; for we can always fall into
thinking that an ad is like a news shot or a private portrait,
its model rightly to be identified with its subject. (In any
case, the imputation of realness to what a picture is of is
unlikely to require our immediate intercession, the presented
events having already transpired; on the other hand, when
Othello attacks Desdemona, something will have to be done
immediately by the audience if they have misframed him as
endangering a real life.) Another difference: It is routine in
play production that we know the personal identity of the
models, at least the lead ones, and that our pleasure in the
show derives in part from watching favorite actors at work,
whatever the part they are currently at work in. In the case
of ads, with very rare exception, the personal identity of the
models is unknown to us, and we do not seek out this
knowledge. Product testimony by celebrities, or by specially
selected citizens whose actual names and addresses are
provided, is quite another matter and is by way of being a
fraud - a fabrication, not a keying. An interesting marginal
case is the photoroman, popular on the continent, in which
personally identified models- indeed "stars" of the cinematic
world-perform for a series of stills in the manner of a comic
book, projecting themselves in fictional parts much as they
might on the screen, and as on the screen relying on their
''own" identities as a source of drawing power (see Van
Dormael 1974).
Starting with caught scenes, the description has been
complicated by adding ones that were fabricated and
keyed. Now it is essential to go on to see that all these
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pictures share one important feature, namely, they are all
scenes, that is, representations, whether candid, faked, or
frankly simulated, of "events" happening. Narrative-like
action is to be read from what is seen, a before and after are
to be inferred, and this location in the ongoing stream of
activity provides the context as much as do the models and
props per se. All such pictures are to be distinguished from
another class, namely, portaits, these being picturesfabricated, keyed, or actually of-where action is absent or
incidental, and it cannot quite be said that a scene is in
progress. A subject is featured more than a stream of events.
(1) Consider first the matter of the personal portrait
format itself. This format was there before the camera came
in, has dominated private pictures, and is only now giving
way: the model sits or stands in his finery, holds an absent,
half-smiling expression on his face in the direction he is
instructed to-a constraint only familiar from the military
parade ground-and renders himself up to the judgment of
eternity, the assumption rightly being that in many ways the
model and the subject are one, a case of posing as oneself. No
doubt this postural formula reflected the exposure needs of
early film and the style (and requirements) established in
painted portraiture- providing us a central case of pictures
representing other pictures; in any case, no prototype is to be
found in the responses individuals, at least sighted ones, have
to any other circumstance in the workaday world. 1 8
(Certainly responses of every kind can be affected and held
by brute force for lengthy periods, but these responses are
presented as though in reaction to something other than
picture taking.) When this portrait format is extended to
commercial shots featuring a subject and a product, the
unseeing expression often gives way to one that is not alien
to natural life, merely crudely simulated: a frozen, summoning look, as though the subject were making eye contact,
sometimes collusively, with someone · there in the flesh
behind the shutter, or with a wider group out there in camera
land. Also found is an expression of defense against
intrusion, a subtle means of encouraging the viewer to feel he
is an actual participant in the depicted scene. So, too,
subjects, especially female ones, may be shown returning our
apparently intrusive look with one that passively submits to
our gaze. More subtle still, the subject can give the
appearance of turning away from a second figure in the
picture sometimes to steal a look at a third figure, in any case
allowing us to catch the maneuver from a disclosive angle so
that we find ourselves more privy to this disloyalty of
attention than is the subject who has lost it. The simulation
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1n recent years stylish portrait photographers have broken with
the traditional format. Instead of inducing frozen facial dignity in a
model, they track down expressions of warmth, charm, liveliness, and
so forth, producing a sense that the individual has been unselfconsciously caught in action. To obtain these expressions, a
considerable warm-up period may be employed and a second camera,
so that the model will not quite know when and from what precise
angle his image will be taken. In this way, every customer can be
transformed into a fitting object for sympathetic, candid photography
and high symbolism, becoming someone who expresses his character,
as well as his status, allowing photographers to make a statement
every time their camera speaks. It is through such practices that those
who make a living reproducing appearances of life can continue
further to stamp the real thin~ out.
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of viewer-responsive facial expression by subjects somewhat
changes a portrait into a scene and is, of course, a standard
feature of Western painting. 1 9 And note the parallel to a
phenomenon peculiar to the legitimate stage called "direct
address."
(2) Early private photographic portraits employed canvas
backdrops featuring sylvan or hellenic scenes (deemed proper
in their three dimensional form to the gentry), thus taking
open advantage of the principle that the camera, somewhat
like the theatrical stage, drops from the world everything
between the figures or objects in central focus and what lies
in front, and at the same time tends to reduce what remains
of the embedding context to a background, a depthless
plane. A recent commercial version is the high fashion
frieze-again something that does not mimic nature-which
splays pristinely costumed female figures flush against exotic
slabs of nature where perhaps only goats and mendicants are
actually to be found, nature here serving as a substitute for
canvas.
(3) In portraiture, this transformation of contextual
space into a point of focus and a flat background is matched
by the transformation of microecological space. Selfcommemoration by a kin group, team, school, or association
packs familiars into compact rank-and-file clusters, graded
for height; decorative kneeling and pyramiding can also be
employed. This assures that a likeness of all the faces wnl
show in the picture, along with at least an inferential view of
the corresponding bodies, and all this as large as the camera
can manage. In this bunching-up of models in order to take a
picture, microecology and body contact are given a systematically different reading than obtains in any other frame,
although the staging of choral singers comes close. Observe, I
have been talking about real space between real peoplemodels, not subjects. The current commercial version of
group pictures presents an even more striking reconstitution
of space, for it brings into jolly togetherness a deep-sea diver,
a Chinese cook, a ballet dancer, a black nurse, a middle-age
housewife, and a grey-haired banker, causing subjects whom
all of social life conspires to keep separate to be arm in arm,
nullifying the basic metaphor indexing social distance
through interpersonal physical space. But, of course, there is
a profound difference between commemoratives and commercials. Teammates who entwine themselves for a portrait
produce a picture of themselves displaying this territorial
promiscuity; professional models who similarly pose themselves do not produce a picture of themselves but of
subjects chosen by advertiser, and it is the intermingling
of subjects in the pictured space, not models in the studio's,
that is striking. After all, professional models, like professional actors, have given up almost all natural claims and
can be caused to appear in almost any guise and almost any
posture.
(4) An individual who serves as a model for a personal
portrait-or does anything else-is someone with a unique
biographical individuality, allowing for a matching between
19

See, for example, Rubens' Helene Fourment in a Fur Coat, and
the discussion in Berger (1975:60-61 ). I might add that a whole art
has developed in radio and TV to induce performers to project their
talk as if to actual audiences located at some prescribed distance, and
as if part of a current interaction. On the contingencies of training
political candidates in these techniques, see Carey (1976).
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subject and personal identity of the model, providing only
that the model is known personally, or at least known of, by
the viewer. (Thus the photographic game of identifying baby
pictures or high school photos or of matching early pictures
of celebrities against their current image.) For viewers of a
portrait, this matching possibility is crucial; ritual use cannot
be made of pictures of just anyone, only pictures of the
famed or of those within one's own circle. In the case of
commercial pictures, this linkage is unnecessary-except in
regard to celebrity or "citizen" testimonials.
Observe that in photographic portraits, the model is
fran kly " posed." His having taken up a position before the
camera simply in order to be photographed in no way
detracts from the picture being thought an authentic, "real"
one. Moreover, what is pictured is what is really going on,
namely, portraiture, the giving of the model over to the
process of being rendered . We would not say, then, that such
a picture was "merely posed," as though to correct anyone's
belief that it was something else. That the background may
be a mere picture of scenery does not discredit the portrait
either, for here there is no pretense that anything but a prop
is involved.
One is reminded here of the frame complexity of
apparently naive photographs and the diverse realms of being
we seem able to easily amalgamate. For example, a photograph may involve not only a model who is a real person and
a backdrop which is a painting of trees, but also a framed
photograph or oil portrait, real in its own sense, used as a
scenic resource, introducing still another plane of events.
Indeed, at the turn of the century mortuary pictures were to
be found in which a framed photographic portrait of the
deceased was set amidst wreaths and real flowers, all placed
in front of a cloudy canvas sky and photographed.
(Incidentally, what resulted was a photograph of a photograph, something that is frame-distinct from a print off the
same negative, the rephotograph of a photograph, and, of
course, a letterpress reproduction of a photograph.) In all of
these ways photographic portraiture has from the beginning
involved embeddings of material from one frame into
materials in another, 2 0 a practice, incidentally, long
employed in painting.
A "real" photographic portrait may be one that strikes
the viewer as bad in various ways: it may be unflattering or
fail to capture the personality the model is "known" to have
or be badly composed, lighted, printed, and so forth. But
these deficiencies do not reflect on the genuineness or
authenticity of the portrait. A question of fabrication and
keying, a question of reality, would enter when we discovered that the portrait was "really" of someone else,
merely someone who looked like the model we thought was
involved or that the picture contained the mere posing of a
posing, as when a commercial advertisement presents some-
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Examples may be found in Lesy (1973). Postcards early in this
century also employed embeddings, the beautiful beloved of the
lonely lover appearing in a balloon above his head, ofttimes
competing for free space with her photograph or portrait, this being a
third realm employed, I suppose, in case the point was missed. Note,
the equivalent of a thought balloon's access to the heated brain of a
figure was a privilege of novelists before the camera was invented.

thing meant to be seen as though a private photographic
portrait when in fact a professional model did the work,
posing in a way he would not were he posing for a
photograph of himself for his own private use. To which
must be added the fact that almost from the beginning of
private personal photographic portraiture, models guyed the
process, taking an avowedly "funny" picture, for example,
one which extended the represented scenery into everything
but a hole for the model's real head to be popped through, or
one in which the model assumed a purposely comic pose.
Commercial pictures then added a lamination, presenting
pictures of professional models posed as private persons
guying a portrait pose. I might add that when a genuine
private photographic portrait is borrowed by a student,
transformed into a slide, and presented to an audience as an
instance of photographic portraiture, then one might have to
say that although a real portrait is being used, it is not being
used in the way intended, and no ritual attaches to its
perception. Form remains; function changes.
Finally, look again at the notion of "posing." A commercial model staging an ad in which he is to appear as a
doctor is "posing," an activity clearly different from
"imposturing" as a doctor (as when someone attempts to
practice medicine without training or a license), and akin to
"acting" a medical role in a movie. But even more clearly,
someone "posing" for his portrait is not doing so in the
commercial model's sense. For, as suggested, in private
portraits there is ordinarily no effort to use scenic cues to
provide the viewer of the picture with an understanding that
a make-believe world is pictured whose subjects have a social
and personal identity little matching that of the models.
Commercial posing avowedly transforms a model into almost
anyone the advertiser wants to construct an imaginary scene
around; private portraiture transforms a model into a
decorative representation of himself, the two "ofs" of
photography here nicely blended. Observe that the question
of primping or posturing for the camera is not here at issue.
Private portraiture, public portraiture for purposes of
publicity, caught news shots of national leaders, and even art
photography of "interesting looking" faces, all reflect the
fundamental fact that their models are not presenting
themselves in a personal or social identity not their "own";
that is what underlies our commonsense designation of these
pictures as "actually of" their subjects. All are to be
contrasted to commercial make-believe, whether fanciful or
fully realistic, for whether a model poses as a doctor or
Napoleon or the devil does not signify here; in all cases
subject and model would not be the same, leading us to say
that we do not have an actual picture of a doctor, Napoleon,
or the devil. (Which is not to say that a model who poses as a
doctor will not provide us with an actual photograph, nor an
actual photograph of an adult, a male, a white person, a
good-looker, a professional model, and so forth. Nor to deny
that an actual photograph of a doctor is a possibility,
whereas an actual photograph of Napoleon or the devil is
not, although an actual photograph of an actual portrait of
Napoleon is, whereas of the devil, not.)

VI

It is apparent that the standards we bring to judging
pictured scenes are not quite those we bring to
judging picture portraits: of the first, is it doctored or
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contrived, and in either case, covertly or overtly; of the
second, is it "touched up," faithful, flattering, and the like.
(Ordinary concerns usually neglect the possibility that what
might seem to be a private portrait might really be the
fabrication or keying of one, this neglect due, perhaps, to the
fact that a portrait is already a keying, already a ritualization
of the human form, already a departure from the simple
rendering of an aspect of the world the way it is for us.) In
any case, the question can be raised as to how, apart from
portraiture, photographs can feature subjects in a way that is
systematically different from the way their models might
deploy themselves when not before a camera. Here, then, is a
concern that does not bear on issues associated with the
physiology and psychology of perception. In brief, what are
the systematic differences between scenes openly contrived
for picturing and live scenes whose participants are unconcerned about being photographed; or, put the other way,
what are the systematic differences between pictures of
openly contrived scenes and pictures of uncontrived ones?
(1) Perhaps the most obvious departure from reality that
photography provides is commercial syncretism. The
capacity to put together a realistic looking scen.e to
photograph is not far away from the capacity to put together
a scene whose individual elements are imaginable as real but
whose combination of elements the world itself could not
produce or allow. Thus fantastical pictures in which a subject
speaks to us from within a block of ice or while soaring
through the air, or mingles socially with figures from myth or
with notables long since dead but now returned in their
prime, or seriously displays ineptness, braggadocio, fearfulness, and hauteur we would only expect to find in
conscious buffoonery, or is subjected to our reading his
thoughts in a balloon that the other figures in the picture
can't see. A more subtle complexity is found in those ads
which intendedly satirize other ads, thus elevating the
make-believe world portrayed in one picture into real
materials to copy in the make-believe world of another,
providing thus a keying of a keying.
(2) Consider now involvement structure. A feature of
social situations is that participants are obliged to sustain
appearances of spontaneous involvement in appropriate
matters at hand. Evidence of an individual's involvement will
come from the direction and mobility of his gaze, as well as
the alignment of his eyes, head, and trunk, these ordinarily
oriented in the same direction. Now it seems that of all
obligatory appearances, that of correct involvement is the
hardest to simulate, and this as if by design. Any attempt to
produce an appropriate show of involvement in something
tends to produce instead an appearance of involvement in the
task of affecting such involvement. 2 1 Although most
individuals acquire the capacity to convincingly contrive a
show of interest in what another is saying or doing, ability
falters when they are required to simulate "natural"
involvement within more complex social arrangements, as
when listening to talk that the talker is himself simulating, or
expressing to one participant a shared reaction regarding
another, or maintaining one conversation in very close
proximity to another. At such moments the individual is
21
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See Goffman, "Alienation from Interaction" (1967:113-136).

likely to induce a sense of uneasiness in viewers, due to the
perceived overfixedness of his gaze and his failure to align
trunk, head, and eyes in the manner we have come to expect.
Perhaps the most obtrusive example is to be seen when an
individual glances at a camera or persons monitoring him but
tries to prevent his trunk and his head from following his
eyes. May I add that our capacity to discern microscopic
discrepancies in anticipated alignments of eyes, head, and
trunk is simply enormous.
(3) Another sort of photographic departure from reality
can be seen by contrasting portraits and scenes. It is clear
that although an image of a person or even of a group of
persons (if in staggered array) can be rather fully caught from
the front by the camera's straight-on eye, the activity in
natural social situations can rarely be well pictured from such
an angle. Best vantage point must be chosen afresh for each
configuration, and this can involve a positioning of the
camera that an eye and its person could hardly manage in
natural social life. More important, _activity may have to be
broken up and spread open, for a camera cannot peer inside
the inward-facing encirclements often found. (After all,
portrait posing is not a posture dictated by what can go on in
social situations; it is through and through an answer to the
special needs of the camera and to the character. of
portraiture.) And such a spread-out array can be staged to
incorporate devices for directing the attention of the viewer
to a central person, which devices do not otherwise appear in
nature. Thus in political publicity shots, one practice is to
have the leader's advisors and children turn their faces from
the camera and self-effacingly look at the main figure,
deictically pointing with their faces and sometimes their
hands in the direction that attention is to follow, even while
the central person waves directly to the camera and the crowd.
All of this is found only where there is a front-on audience or a
camera, and is radically different from the inward turning exhibited in ordinary face-to-face interaction. 22
There are other instructive differences between portraits
and pictured scenes. In both cases, the persons who model
for the pictures have unique biographical (personal)
identities. As suggested, for the owner of a photographic
portrait, the possibility of making this identification is
central to the ritual function the portrait will have. But not
so in the case of commercial pictures, except perhaps when
the picture features a personal testimonia1. 2 3 Presumably
22

0ther unnatural devices for exhibiting dominance are available
to photographers. For example, a cliche of advertisements is to
picture one individual who is in the close company of another looking
at that other adoringly and self-effacingly, as if the other's use of the
advertised product had rendered him worthy of such attention. Although openly loving looks at close quarters are sometimes addressed
to the very young as part of their easy transformation into nonpersons, these expressions between adults are not common, being incompatible with other interaction obligations of the adorer to the adored.
23
Portraits taken of anonymous models by renowned photographers can become prized by the collectors, and in this sense have
ritual value, but here because the picture provides a contact with the
taker, not the taken. There are, of course, various efforts to constitute
photographs into objects of scarcity-into relics-and thereby into items
of monetary value. Prints from the original negative are apparently distinguishable from re-photographs of the text. The skill involved in
developing and enlarging can itself be claimed as identifiable and
therefore a means of distinguishing products. Etc. (For all of which,
and for much other help, I am grateful to Lee Ann Draud.}
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what the advertisement is concerned to depict is not
particular individuals already known, but rather activity
which would be recognizable were we to see it performed in
real life by persons not known to us personally. (Which is not
to say that the subjects may not be depicted in a manner to
imply that they would naturally know each other very well.)
In effect, pictured scenes show examples of categories of
persons, not particular persons. Now observe that although in
real life we obtain lots of views of persons whom we can
merely place in social categories, unless we also know them
personally or have good business reasons to be dealing with
them, we are not in a position to witness what we witness
about them in commercial scenes. Indeed, there are many
pictured scenes, such as that of husband and wife in their
bedroom, that no business or acquaintanceship could warrant
our seeing. Only a peeping tom of unprecedented capabilities
could manage the view. Like readers of what a novelist
supplies of his characters, the viewer becomes god-like,
unconstrained by any need of legitimate social grounds for
being privy to what is depicted in the scene. 2 4 In short, the
possibility of arranging a scene from the visual pinpoint of
view of a single camera's eye-into which angle and distance
of vision vast hordes of viewers can be thrust-is a social
license as well as an optical one.
(4) A feature of the photographic frame is the possibility of
eschewing the depiction of ordinary life for high symbolism.
Thus, an image of part of a model's body can be made to fill
the whole picture, articulated to be read as a deep comment
on the entire human condition, not merely an example
drawn from it, and providing us with a picture whose subject
is not a person but a small part of the anatomy, such as a
fingertip. A lesser version of this expressionism must be
considered, being more common and probably more significant.
In real situations, we externalize our circumstances and
intent, in effect facilitating the adaptation of others in our
surround to us. But in a manner of speaking, this display
tends to occur as part of a stream of acts in the same order of
being, some of which acts have just occurred and others of
which are likely to start occurring. In private and publicity
portraiture, individuals can be given a quite different relation
to what they display. Two boxers taking weighing-in
pub Iicity shots will assume a fighting pose, choreographing
an illustration of the actions they will engage in. But these
actions are "mere" representations, totally cut off from any
actual sequence in which the orginals might occur. And
indeed, little competence in fistic arts is required- to evince
the pose. What we obtain are photographic recordings of
emblems, not actions. Similarly, when a renowned scientist
graciously submits to a magazine interview (in the interests
of disseminating knowledge), he is likely to be posed
fingering his equipment as though a slice of his occupational
life had been caught: he is shown peering into a microscope,
writing a formula on the board, holding a test tube up to the
24

Cartoon strips provide other transformations of the everyday.
For example, the protagonists can be at a distance or even hidden yet
their words can be ballooned into the foreground, in effect allowing
the viewer to bug distal voices. Here, and in regard to other aspects of
the transformation rules of the cartoon frame, see Fresnault-Deruelle

(1975a, 1975b, 1976).

light, or arranging a fossil. Thereby he crudely mimes a
posture plucked from his own role, momentarily transforming the living tools of his trade into dramaturgic
equipment and himself into a pantomimist of fixed
expressions. And what we see is not a photographic record of
an actual scene from the scientist's life, as would be available
were a secret camera trained on his laboratory, nor a clever
contrivance of such a photographic record (this presented
either as a real one or as an admitted simulation), but
something that is only to be found as a posing for a picture,
having been staged in response to a conception of what
would make a colorful, telling photograph, and, behind this,
a conception of what constitutes the appropriate convention
for "representing" the particular calling. 2 5 Obviously in all
these cases what one has is not intention display in the
ethological sense, since emblems of the model's calling do
not tell us what is to happen (or what is threatened or
promised), but rather the sort of activity the model chooses
to be identified with, this activity being symbolized, as it
were, by a quotation of one of its dramatically telling
phases. 2 6 What in fact probably has happened is that the
staff photographer has okayed the pose, and what probably
will happen is that the scientist will soon exchange
pleasantries with his departing guests-these events belonging
to an order of activity radically different from the one
intendedly portrayed in the picture.

VII

It is plain, then, that except in the case of caught
scenes, the arrangements of models and scenic
resources that the camera photographs will differ systematically from the way the unposing world is. Now one
should consider the contrary issue: the carryover of the way
the world is to any photograph. For the transformational
code for representing reality in pictures-the photographic
frame-would hardly be a code were not some sort of
relationship systematically preserved between what is transformed and the transformation. But in the question of
carryover, some preliminary discussion is required.
Photographs (like pencil sketches) can be used to illustrate
25

For this latter point, and for other suggestions incorporated
without further acknowledgment, I am very grateful to john Carey.
26
Scientists are here used as an example because one might think
they would balk at such nonsense. Examples are even easier to find
among business leaders who appear in news magazines and annual
company reports busy with an executive-like action whose posing
could only have taken them away from such duties. In truth it seems
that nigh everyone can be persuaded by publicists to appear to the
public at large in a mock-up of themselves and their occupations, an
amateur theatrics to which politicians are also willing to subject their
greetings, farewells, commiserations, and other intimacy rituals. Nor is
this readiness to reframe one's own doings so that the public will get a
synoptic view of one's role a particularly contemporary phenomenon.
Bourgeois society has never wanted for persons ready to see the need
for a permanent display of themselves in somber portrait oils,
clutching a book, a ledger, a riding crop, or a rose, framing themselves
thus in some sort of mystical relation to the equipment of their
vocation, a touching encouragement to the worship that others might
be willing to offer to exemplifications of what is best in humanity.
Perhaps one should see the readiness for this sort of personal publicity
as entirely natural to the self, and a modest life a perversion forced
upon the masses for want of anything like an adequate supply of
board rooms and marble fireplaces.
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behavioral practices and arrangements, typically by virtue of
models having been posed accordingly. The kind of practices
photographs can best illustrate are those that are firmly
codified as to form and can be represented from beginning to
end, in toto, within the visual field that can be nicely
encompassed 'by short-range camera focus. 2 7 Of course, one
is likely to be interested in photographable behavioral
practices because they are routinely associated with particular social meanings, and it is admittedly the sign vehicle, not
the signification, that is precisely illustratable.
As I use the term "illustration," no implication is
intended about existence; an illustrated practice may have
occurred, but illustration itself does not attest to such
occurrence, belonging to subjects, not models. It is, then,
perfectly reasonable to expect that illustrations may be
found across several modes of representation, some clearly
involving make-believe. For example, the "arm-lock," the
standard adult cross-sex tie-sign in our society, can be
illustrated by means of what can be found in comics,
cartoons, realistic ads, news shots of celebrities who are
"on," two actors taking the part of a couple on the theatrical
stage, caught pictures from ordinary life scenes, and, of
course, live scenes. More to the point, across these quite
different realms of being, no systematic relevant difference
seems detectable in the armlocks depicted; the form of this
display can be, and very often is, perfectly represented in
toto in any of these frames.
Photographs can also be used to provide documentation or
an instance-record of the sort of behavorial practice which
can be illustrated pictorially. An instance-record is evidence
(which a mere illustration is not) that an instance of the
practice did occur as pictured on the occasion of the picture
taking. Call such a picture an instantiation. Note that a
picture which records an instance of a practice, that is,
instantiates it, is necessarily a good illustration of it,
something that can't be said of many other kinds of records.
And observe that pictures can be used not merely to provide
instance-records of practices already known, but also to help
us become aware of practices theretofore unidentified.
Now note that if one's interest is in the picturing of scenes
as well as in the scenes that are pictured, then the difference
between illustration and instantiation can become complicated. For any photograph which merely illustrates a
behavioral practice must also provide not merely an
instance-record of the illustrative practice, but an instance
itself. And the same can be said when one passes beyond
illustration itself to symbolization, namely, a referencing
based on what may be a loose, uncodified connection
between sign and meaning {or a fixed but thoroughly
conventional one), and upon an evoked significance which
may bear little relation to the facts. A creditably candid
wedding picture of the groom placing a ring on the finger of
the bride not only attests reliably to a wedding having taken
place, but also supplies us with a special segment of the
ceremony, one that has come to serve as a symbol of the
whole, and behind this, as a symbol of the presumably loving
relationship that was solemnized on the occasion. In fact,
27

For example, tongue showing: Smith, Chase, and Lieblich

(1974).
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however, the pictured event itself does not provide us with
evidence of the sequence of specific ritual details out of
which the wedding in question was formulated, or evidence
of the quality of the relationship thereby ratified. What can
be instantiated in completed form {and what is therefore
most suitable to pictorial research) involves lesser matters,
such as the asymmetry of the traditional ring ritual, the
general styling of wedding rings, and the choice of fingers
thought proper for the placement of this piece of ceremonial
jewelry. On the other hand, an "expressive" picture does
provide an actual instance of the use in pictures of
stereotyped symbolizations of wider social events and
relationships.
The differences among illustrations, instance records, and
symbolizations as here defined, complicate the analysis of
pictures. A further bedevilment is the "photographic
fallacy," namely, the very general tendency to confuse
realness with represen tativeness and ideographic with
nomothetic validity. A caught photograph of persons in
action can provide all the evidence that one needs that a
particular event- such as a wedding- very likely did occur.
But that sufficiency is for those interested in the particulars
of the past, in a word, biography. If instead one is interested
in social routines, in customary behavioral patterns, then a
wedding picture must differently figure; it can provide an
instance record of, say, placement pattern with respect to the
ring, but very little evidence concerning the social characteristics of the populations across which the practice is found .
and the\ range of contexts in which it occurs among these
people- in fact, little evidence that one is dealing with a
pattern at all. Yet when one establishes that a picture of
something really is of the subject it portrays, it is very hard
to avoid thinking that one has established something beyond
this, namely, something about the event's currency,
typicality, commonness, distribution, and so forth. The
paradox is that "small behaviors" are what can be very fully
instantiated by a single photograph, but one such picture can
only establish the feasibility of actual occurrence. {The
picture of Lee Harvey Oswald being shot provides excellent
evidence of how a revolver was held on one occasion and,
more important, Jack Ruby's guilt in this connection; but
the picture provides little evidence of how hand guns are
generally held for close range firing.) To which one must add
that very often the sort of event whose mere occurrence-not
typicality of occurrence- is of biographical or historic
interest is one that cannot be photographed in the round
throughout its course, but only in cross-section, as it were,
this moment often providing very inadequate evidence of the
occurrence and character of the event as a whole.

VIII

Turn now to the question of carryover. Whether a
pictured scene is caught, faked, or, in varying
degrees realistically mocked-up, the model will bring elements of himself to it, affording to the viewers something of
what he affords the eyes of actual participants· in his real
scenes. Just as a stage actor {but not an opera singer) can
hardly perform a part in a language other than one in which
he has a real competence, so models, professional or amateur,
cannot transform themselves completely for a photographic
appearance, at least if they are not to be encumbered with a
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massive disguise. In theory at least, personal identity will be
recoverable, ofttimes also the unique setting in which the
photograph occurred (if not by us, then by modeling
agencies, the police, kinsmen of the models, or whoever).
However, if our interests are not ritualistic, as when we
cherish a picture of Aunt Mabel because she herself can be
identified in it, or legalistic, as when we establish that the
person a certificate authorizes is the person who is presenting
the authorization, or playful, as when we match early
portraits against later ones, but rather academic, namely, to
inquire into the way the world is, then identifiability as such
ceases to be central.
Other matters will be more important. We are all in our
society trained to employ a somewhat common idiom of
posture, position, and glances, wordlessly choreographing
ourselves relative to others in social situations with the effect
that interpretability of scenes is possible. Some of this idiom
we automatically continue to employ in composing and
posing for scenes that are to be photographed- jumbled up,
of course, with crude patches of gross symbolization for the
camera.
But that is only the beginning, for however posed and
"artificial" a picture is, it is likely to contain elements that
record instances of real things. The scene pictured on the
backdrop of a photographic portrait might be a painted
fantasy, but the chair the subject sits on is real enough and
speaks to a real genre of chairs, not pictures. (Students
question the sense in which a chair can be said to be real, but
that sort of doubt is not here at issue, for however that
question is answered, the fact still remains that a picture of a
chair is a radically different thing from a chair itself.) The
clothes worn on the occasion are often Sunday best,
sometimes causing the wearer to feel "unnatural," but, of
course, in all likelihood there will be real ceremonial
occasions when the same garb will have been worn, the
limiting case here being the wedding gown, since it may be
worn and pictured on the same and (often) only occasion.
The way a female model for a seated private portrait manages
her legs can be a very studied effect helped along sometimes
by the photographer, but what the two here strive for in this
apparently artificial way can be exactly what she strives for
when seated at a party facing viewers from the front; what
one is learning about, then, is how she might choreograph
herself for front views in general, not for camera views in
particular. The same can be said for the Western male
practice of covering the crotch when in a sitting position.
The fact that male subjects from non-Western cultures tend
not to exhibit this protectiveness in portraits is not a specific
difference between their pictures and ours, merely an
incidental one, being specific to the more general issue of
behavior when exposed to direct view, and pertains to
models, not merely subjects. When a movie starlet couple at a
nightclub back bench suddenly adjust their faces into the
stylized teeth grimace found mainly in photographs, doing
this because a cameraman has come into sight, the free
distance between their rumps can still reflect spacing
practices in uncontrived scenes, not merely contrived
ones-although admittedly in photographs indexed distances
and especially depths are hard to measure. And by examining
the spacing and body orientation of the two in regard to
other ~ubjects in the picture, we come to take it for granted,

probably quite correctly, that the two constitute a "with,"
drawing here on precisely the same cues we would
automatically employ when functioning as actual
participants of live scenes.

IX

Given that pictures may be organized as portraits or as
scenes (and if the latter, caught, faked, or realistic to a
degree), and given the distinction between illustration and
instantiation, and the contrast of both of these to evocative
symbolizations providing at best a purely conventional
relation between vehicle and sign, and given further that one
can be concerned about the nature of pictures as well as the
nature of the world, it is possible to begin to see how
heterogeneous a photograph may be as an object of academic
interest.
One finds in pictures not only rules of scene production
that are exclusive to pictures, but also photographic conventions peculiar to particular subject matters. For example,
portrait photographers routinely touch up negatives or prints
to improve the complexion of the subjects appearing in
them, creating a people that has smoother skin than that
found among mortals. In ads brunette women tend to be
styled somewhat differently from blond women; this
presumably a characteristic of pictures, not Iife. 28
The settings in which members of a family snap one
another are not fabricated for the purpose, are not merely
props, but, as with the real settings used in home movies, 29
are hardly a haphazard selection from all the ones the family
employs, and can only have the effect of producing a false
general impression of its habitat. The expensive backdrops
found in most commercial scenes can be found in the real
world but only in very narrow circles. (Once rented or
donated as background for a film or an advertisement, these
environments can become merely another element of the
world to which the viewer has pictorial access; they can
become unrealistically familiar.) The females depicted in
commercially posed scenes have straighter teeth and are
slimmer, younger, taller, blonder, and "better" looking than
those found in most real scenes, even most real scenes
occurring in stylish settings, but certainly these figures are
similar to the ones found in uncontrived, live scenes that
occur in modeling agencies and other real places where
mainly models foregather- which places, note, may not be
luxuriously furnished. In contrast, the fact that women in
American advertisements show no hair on their legs or under
their arms can be taken to reflect directly the shaving
28

Suggested in Milium (1975:142).
See Chalfen (1975:96). Commercial movies can be shot in a
studio containing hand-fashioned environments, or on an open studio
lot, or in a geographical region that is similar in terrain to the real
thing but closer to hand, or "on location" where the fictive events are
purported to occur. But "real" in the last case must be used with care.
Because mocked-up events are staged in these settings, often set in an
epoch before or after the actual moviemaking, and because the
ordinary traffic of people and events must be roped off during
shooting, the realism provided by the setting can only serve to
heighten the illusion, as when a con man manages to make use of a
real banking office to hoodwink a mark. Reliance on such backdrops
to establish life-likeness gives them a significance different from what
they would ordinarily have, transforming them-as far as function is
concerned-into quotations or symbols of themselves.
29
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practice prevalent among women throughout America. (But
the hairless legs and armpits displayed in French advertisements cannot similarly be taken as evidence of appearances
beyond the camera, for in Franee, American depilatory
practices so far have mostly influenced the commercially
pictured world.) Finally, the general difference in hair
styling, facial decoration, and clothing pattern that distinguishes male subjects from female subjects in American
advertisements is by and large true of how males in all
Westernized countries are distinguished from females both in
posings for advertisements and in uncontrived scenes. To
which must be added that what is common to commercial
scenes and rare in life may yet be commonly part of the
ideals and fantasies of many actual people.
In sum, between commercially posed scenes and live ones
there is every kind of carryover and almost every kind of
discrepancy. Nor are matters in any way fixed. As soon as a
formulaic feature of commercially choreographed scenes is
uncovered and publicized, advertisers are in a position to
self-consciously initiate a sharply contrary policy or to
present guyed versions of the old. Withal, the art of analysis
is to begin with a batch of pictures and end up with
suggestions of unanticipated features of uncontrived scenes,
or with representations of themes that are hard to write
about but easy to picture, or with illustrations of novel
differences between pictures and life. And throughout, I
believe, the issue of exploration should be kept separate
temporally from the issue of proof. Arrangements which
hold for many live scenes (or many pictured ones) lie ready
to be uncovered in one example, but not direct evidence
concerning their actual distribution.

X

Finally, another look at the notion of a "scene," along
with a review of the concept of commercial realism.
Consider first the organizational constraints all scenes in
advertisements might share and presuppose, and the liberties
that can (but aren't necessarily) taken in their assembly; in
short, consider the realm of being of which the drama in
every individual ad is but an instance.
It is easy to contrast what goes on in ads to what goes on
in the real world and conclude- as commentators are
wont- that advertisements present a dolled-up, affluent
version of reality, but this does not tell us about the
structure of advertising's world, that is, the way in which it is
put together. So, too, it is easy to see commercial realism as
constituting but another make-believe realm (along with the
theater, cartoons, the novel, etc.) and to contrast all these
merely fictive domains with reality; but however instructive,
this comparison, I think, misses the point. For although such
a contrast ought to be made, there is another that should
proceed it. To explicate commercial realism one must start
with the notion of "scene," whether live or fictive, and only
after scenes have been contrasted to other ways of organizing
understanding should, I think, one go on to contrast the
commercially depicted variety in pictures to live, uncontrived
ones.
The term "scene" is itself not a particularly happy one.
An actual view, or a picture of a view, of something that is
relatively unchanging-like a forest or a skyline- is called a
scene, as is any background or backdrop, however bustling,
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which a playwright or novelist might w~nt to set as the
general context of his action. A segment of an act in a stage
play (something an act may have anywhere from one to ten
of, each offering continuous action in one place) is also
called a scene. A quarrel between related persons, conducted
in a manner sensed to be open by onlookers to whom the
disputants are less related, is also called a scene. And there is
a current vernacular use, referring to something that an
individual might make, dig, or dislike. The scenes this paper
has been concerned with are of a different order.
In actual life as we wend our way through our day we pass
into and out of immediate perception range of sequences of
others; fleeting opportunity for viewing also occurs when
they pass us. In metropolitan circu.mstances this means that
we will be momentary onlookers of those whom we cannot
identify biographically through name or appearance, that is,
that we will catch glimpses of courses of action of strangers.
Due to the warranted reputation of various behavioral
settings and to the conventions of self-presentation, we will
be able to infer something about the social identity (age, sex,
race, class, etc.) of these strangers, their personal relationship
to one another, their mood, and their current undertakings,
these last, typically, only broadly categorized.
The totality of viewings of the courses of action of
strangers which we obtain throughout our days constitutes
our glimpsed world. This is not quite an impersonal world,
especially for sophisticated viewers. But it is a truncated one,
and one in which almost everything can be located in broad
categories only. It is ordinarily bereft of details concerning
the lives of those who are witnessed in passing and bereft of
their longitudinal point of view regarding what they are seen
as being and doing. (We strangers do not see John and Mary
comparison shopping for a broach to replace the one that
was lost last wee·k at Jean's party, nor do we detect that their
apparent dallying is due to their having to kill some time
before going on to catch the new Fellini. That is what they
see. We see a young middle-class couple looking at things in
a jewelry store.) Observe, then, that to glimpse a world is not
somehow to happen upon an intimate revealing drama that
was not meant for us. Nor is it to obtain a somehow marred,
distorted, fragmentary view of the whole, something that can
be caused to snap back into its proper shape by the addition
of new information or the exercise of interpretive skill. It is
not as though we were cryptographers having to start with a
partially deciphered text, able to take comfort in the
prospect of eventual .success in unlocking what has all along
been there. Or cardiologists interpreting the sounds of a
stethescope for the character of a patient's diseasefT o
glimpse a world rather is to employ a set of categories more
or less distinctive to glimpsing and often entirely adequate
for the job they are designect to do. Nor are these categories
rough and undeveloped; indeed, the persons glimpsed are
likely to be quite aware of precisely how they can be read,
and will have as part of their concern to conform to
anticipated displayings of themselves and to use these
behavioral rubrics as a cover behind which to pursue all
manner of unpublishable projects. Yet no amount of
supplementary information of the kind we are likely to
obtain is likely to bring us to the private view that the
objects of our attention will themselves have of their own
undertakings. To be sure, our passing views as strangers and
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the sustained views of participants are not usually contradictory, and rough correspondences could be worked out, but
inevitably our concerns and theirs will be considerably
different, as to a degree will be the world their conventional
public behavior generates for us and the world they are in
while moving from point to point under these ensigns.
Now although there are real individuals whose glimpsed
world is almost their only one, most of us Iive, and
principally, in other worlds, ones having a longitudinal
character, featuring extended courses of interlinked action
and unique relationships to other people. Observe that a
stage play or even a comic strip provides us with something
quite beyond a glimpse of the lives (albeit fictional lives) of
its characters; for we · are given considerable personal
information about the protagonists and can link together
various glimpsings of them, in consequence of which we can
enter into their courses of action in more detail and with
much more temporal depth than is ordinarily possible in the
case of our real passing views of the lives of strangers.
Commercial realism (along with certain cartoons and
other drawings) provides, then, something of the same sort of
realm as the one a stranger to everyone around him really
lives in. The realm is full of meaningful viewings of others,
but each view is truncated and abstract in the ways
mentioned.
And now having noted the significant similarity between
live scenes and the ones pictured in advertisements, one can
go on to properly locate the consideration already given of
differences. To repeat: glimpses of real Iife (I ike caught
photographs of it) provide us with models who are
portraying themselves, whereas commercial realism does
not-cartoons and other drawings may not even employ
models. Yet there are ways in which commercial realism
provides us something that is fuller and richer than real
glimpses. First, ads (along with cartoons and other one-shot
drawings) are intentionally choreographed to be unambiguous about matters that uncontrived scenes might well
be uninforming about to strangers. Second, scenes contrived
for photographing (just as the ones drawn in comics) can be
shot from any angle that the c~meraman chooses, the
subjects themselves splayed out to allow an unobstructed
view; these are two liberties that a person viewing a live scene
cannot take. Finally, short of engaging in voyeuristic activity,
a real person is very considerably restricted as to the sorts of
live scenes he will be allowed to glimpse from whatever angle,
for his presence in a place always requires social warrant. In
advertised worlds, however, we can look in on almost
everything. Observe that these dramaturgic advantages of

commercial realism over real life, other fictional realms have
also, along with some advantages that commercial realism
lacks.
A closing comment. The magical ability of the advertiser
to use a few models and props to evoke a life-like scene of his
own choosing is not primarily due to the art and technology
of commercial photography; it is due primarily to those
institutionalized arrangements in social life which allow
strangers to glimpse the lives of persons they pass, and to the
readiness of all of us to switch at any moment from dealing
with the real world to participating in make-believe ones.
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